Iranian Embassy's Siege and the British Hypocrisy

“Britain holds annual commemoration service for its police force killed in that incident and hails the skills of its police. Apparently, there is no one to remind London that the British police let the Iranian embassy staff to be killed and it also killed the terrorists on the spot. Moreover, I was denied a British entry visa for my follow up in a relevant committee.” These are parts of the remarks made by Dr. Gholamali Afrooz, the then Iranian chargé d'affaires in London when the Iranian Embassy was seized in April 1980.

A few days after the military operations in Tabas to rescue the American hostages ended in fiasco, the British intelligence service which is more dexterous that the American services in using traitor and second hand agents, dispatched a number of Arab youth with the support of the Iraqi Baathist embassy to the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in an attempt to prepare for a few-day hostage taking.

 

Contrary to the regulations for protection of diplomats, the London policeman at the time of hostage taking enters the embassy premises under the pretext of drinking a cup of coffee and at the time of the arrival of the hostage takers opens the door to them and spends three days inside the embassy while being armed and finally he receives a badge of honor.

 

After six days of hostage taking and martyrdom of an Iranian diplomat, the British royal police entered into the embassy upon (former British Prime Minister Margaret) Thatcher’s orders and after killing five of the six hostage takers, of whom four had already surrendered themselves, they mistakenly kill (martyr) Samadzadeh instead of the sixth hostage taker in an attempt to eliminate all traces! A few hours later, the special police set fire to the Iranian Embassy which turns the premises into rubbles!

 

Pursuant to this British show, Margaret Thatcher, the then British Prime Minister in a letter to Imam Khomeini demands release of the American hostages in return for the operations of the British royal police! On the night when the British Embassy was seized by the revolutionary students in Tehran, the BBC offered a deviated version of the incident and Iranian traitors residing in London tried to purify and make champions out of the British security and intelligence officers.

 

What you will read below is a brief account of the seizure of the Iranian Embassy in London on 30 April – 6 May 1980 and remarks by Dr Gholamali Afrooz, the then IRI chargé d'affaires in London who was disabled as a result.

 

In March 1980 six Arab nations with Iranian, Syrian and Iraqi citizenships leave Baghdad for London.

 

They had previously been trained shooting under the supervision of Sami Mohammad Ali, a Baathist officer, who was later prosecuted on charges of being connected with terrorist activities of George Habash Organization and for murdering Palestinian Fatah representative in London. Sami Mohammad later joins them in London and puts the same guns he had received though diplomatic post of the Iraqi Embassy in London at the disposal of the aforementioned Arabs in order to attack the Iranian Embassy after reviewing the embassy map.

 

Although members of the group claim to be Muslim, however during their stay in London they had to change their residence twice as their drinking habit and association with prostitutes disturbs their neighbors.

 

According to a pre-orchestrated plan, at 11 a.m. on April 30 following the attack on the main building of Iran’s Embassy at Princess Gate, London, the British police disarms the embassy and enters the building. As a result of shattering of the embassy windows, a policeman receives minor injuries on his face. The armed men break into the building and take 26 hostages for six days.

 

Out of the 26, some 17 are the staff, eight Iranians and foreign applicants and one security guard. The seizure of the Iranian Embassy in London takes place five days after the failure of the US military attack on Tabas desert. The Tass News Agency and Pravda newspaper (of Russia) believe that the US and Britain are behind the attack in an attempt to put pressures on Iran to release the American hostages in Tehran.

 

The seizure of the Iranian Embassy takes place following repeated threats by the Baathists and a failed attack a few days earlier on the Iranian Embassy in Beirut. This is while Iranian chargé d'affaires Dr. Gholamali Afrooz in an official letter to the counter-terrorism department of the British police, had asked for further protection. A day before the attack, the London police in a letter gives its reassurances in this regard.

 

Two BBC reporters who were among the hostages air the demand of the occupiers who call for the release of 91 political prisoners in Saudi Arabia, dismissal of Seyed Ahmad Madani, the then Governor General of Khuzestan, and an airplane for safe departure from Britain.

 

The Iranian foreign minister rejects the demand of the hostage takers. Iranian students residing in London stage a sit-in strike in front of the embassy demanding their exchange with the hostages. The students clash with London radical rightists and police.

 

Inside the embassy, the former administrative staff adopt a conservative approach but the new, young and revolutionary personnel, especially Martyr Ali Akbar Samadzadeh clash with the occupiers and – together with Dr. Afrooz - resist against their insult to Imam Khomeini.

 

On the other hand, the British government which is involved in secessionist and independence-seeking trends with Ireland, does not wish a good ending to the hostage taking and is willing to send a message to Iran to change its stance towards the American hostages. A session of a “grand committee” chaired by the British home secretary is held to review adoption of necessary measures and actions.

 

With the passage of time and Iran’s refusal to accept the demand of the occupiers and resistance of the hostages such as Mr. Lavasani and Dr. Afrooz, the occupiers discuss their demand with the ambassadors of the three Arab states (Iraq, Jordan, Libya or Syria) and later agree to meet with even one Arab diplomat so that afterwards they would put their arms down and surrender. But, the Grand Committee for certain reasons refuses to accept such a demand and puts its SAS forces on alert. This is the first mission of these aggressive and ultra swift forces in inland police operations and the government is willing to deploy them for legitimizing suppression of the Irish people. 

 

While the occupiers postpone their deadline for blowing up the embassy building at least for three times following the repeated promises of the police for their imminent meeting with Arab diplomats, a fragile mental condition governs over the residents of the embassy. Police, who had ignored recommendations of the psychiatrics and experts of terrorist activities, by excessively restricting the occupiers, suddenly makes them furious.

 

Leaders of the occupiers are disappointed with meeting Arab diplomats as the Arab diplomats are told at the Grand Committee that they could visit the hostage takers as a prey which is not acceptable to the Arab diplomats.

 

The occupiers, after becoming frustrated, threaten to kill one hostage every half an hour. Their first choice was Dr. Abbas Lavasani who nominated himself in place of Dr. Ezati, the aged cultural counselor of the embassy. Dr. Ezati was already suffering from nervous breakdown due to the intimidations of the occupiers.

 

The occupiers shoot Dr. Lavasani three times and throw his body outside the building. He was an Iranian student hired by press section of the embassy for one fifth of a normal wage.

 

After finding out that its measures had failed, the police order the launch of SAS commando attack.

 

The commandos enter the building from several points by using incendiary grenades and tear gas and kill all the hostage takers, including three of them who had already surrendered. Two of the occupiers in the last moments enter the room where hostages are kept and open fire on them wounding three, namely Dr. Afrooz, Dr. Ezati and Engineer Samadzadeh. It should be noted that Martyr Samadzadeh was about to marry a British girl who had recently converted into Islam. He too worked at the press section of the embassy.

 

The only remaining occupier was a person called Ali who was hiding among the hostages and police mistook for Samadzadeh. It should be noted that Samadzadeh’s body remained at the embassy – together with the bodies of two other terrorists – for three days and is hurt in the following arson at the embassy and collapse of the ceiling. Furthermore, no autopsy is conducted to establish the cause of death. Two injured Iranians undergo surgical operation at the hospital and receive treatment. 

 

Dr. Afrooz is now manager of Peyvand publications which is about children and young adult psychology and Dr. Ezati is professor of Islamic philosophy in Britain.

The survived terrorist, despite the request of the Iranian government, is not handed over and is tried in London and put in prison there. A number of Iranian students later arrested for their protest demonstration in front of the US Embassy in London, hold talks with Ali in the section for political prisoners. 

 

Subsequent police research discloses that the occupiers had been armed by the Iraqi Embassy in London. Police efforts to arrest Sami Mohammad Ali prove useless. 

 

The British government stages widespread media and diplomatic attempts to take advantage of the incident to create disinformation and force Iran to release the American hostages.

 

Brief interpretation

 

Following is the list of the employed and local staff of the embassy at the time of hostage taking

incident at 11:30 a.m. April 30, 1980 which was started with the attack of six terrorists and ended six days later at 5 p.m. on 5 May 1980:

 

A- Employed staff

 

1- Dr Gholamali Afrooz, chargé d'affaires 

2- Ali Ezati, cultural-press section

3- Ms Farida Mozafarian, third secretary (now retired)

4- Taqi Tojoori, financial-administrative officer

5- Mohamamd Moheb, financial-administrative officer (redeemed and probably a US resident)

6- Issa Naqizadeh Ardebili, second secretary (retired)

7- Abu Taleb Shahverdi Moqaddam, telecommunication officer (retired)

 

B- Local staff

 

8- Ms Hashemian, a local staff (press section)

9- Ms Zomorodian, local staff (press section)

10- Roya Kaghazchi (secretary of charge d’affaires), grown up in Britain and France (born to Iranian parents)

11- Ahmad Dadgar (medical section)

12- Ms Sanaei (secretary of financial-administrative section)

13- The late Lavasai (cultural-press section)

14- The late Samadzadeh (cultural-press section)

15- Ms Boroumand (typist-call center)

16- Fallahi (information-security of the entrance gate)

17-    Ronal Maurice (driver of embassy head and in charge of postal affairs. He was a British citizen)

 

List of other Iranian and foreign nationals who were within the embassy at that time:

 

18- Mostafa Karkuti, report of the Lebanese As-Safir publication in London (a Syrian national who was a suspicious individual and terrorists would occasionally consult with him. A night after the attack he was helped to escape)

19- Ali Gol, an Afghan national applying for Iran visa

20- Two BBC reporters

21- British police safeguarding the entrance gate (he was armed until the end of the incident. He was not on duty on that day. He should have guarded outside)

22- Heydar Khabbaz, interim reporter of Kayhan newspaper in London (student)

23- Tabatabaei, employee of the Central Bank of Iran (a trainee at the British Midland Bank who had referred to the embassy on that day to receive a flag)

24-Mah Navard, a bus driver (who was in London for his treatment and had referred to the embassy to inquire about address of his doctor)

25- Farooqi, head of a Britain-based publication (a British citizen of Pakistani origin, who had possibly come to the embassy for visa and for talks with Ezati)

 

Written comments of Dr. Gholamali Afrooz

 

 Since a long time ago there was a growing possibility of any type of revengeful attack against

diplomatic missions of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its chargé d'affaires in London. All possible precautionary measures had been taken in order to provide security not only for the embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran but for all Iranian organizations such as the Iran Air Office (Homa), Banks, etc. Given that the embassy staff were barred from carrying weapons and deployment of an armed guard for further protection were against the prevailing British regulations, and demands of the embassy from local authorities in this connection had always received a negative response, the issue of further security for the embassy and its branch offices had been discussed with the officials of the Foreign Office and special diplomatic police. But, except for a patrol police in front of the embassy, no specific measure was adopted to protect safety of the staff, and the chargé d'affaires.

 

It should be noted that this is the method applied for protection of most embassies by the British government and police. 

 

On Wednesday 30 April, as usual a policeman was standing in front of the entrance gate of the embassy and the information officer was busy with his duty. I was also engaged with my own work at my office. About 11:30 a.m. I heard shooting from the first floor and shortly the terrorists appeared in front of my room. Of course, I still don’t know what happened in my room that at least until late on Wednesday night when I had a telephone conversation with foreign minister, I was unconscious.

 

The terrorists after getting out of the car were waiting outside the embassy and by the time when an applicant was about to leave the embassy one of the terrorists took advantage of the opportunity and prevented closure of the door. He shot the first bullet which shattered the window of the entrance door. He then shot another bullet which forced the guard to surrender and they entered into the building. 

 

The number of terrorists according to eyewitnesses was six whose mother tongue was Arabic but most of them, except for two, could speak Farsi fluently. The leader of the group was armed with an Uzi machine gun and a rifle and his deputy with an Uzi and three others with guns and two with grenades and one with a revolver and a hand grenade.

 

The primary demand of the group was release of 91 prisoners who were members of the “Political Organization of Arab People in Arabia” (Khuzestan) who later also demanded to hold talks with Arab ambassadors (Algeria-Jordan-Iraq) on unconditional release of themselves together with the hostages and their departure to another country (obviously Iraq).

 

On Thursday I proposed to the group to keep me until the end, either in London or elsewhere, kill me but release all other hostages who, as they said, were not important for them. They only responded by shooting one bullet into the ceiling of my room. As it was mentioned earlier, since the third day of the hostage taking, the main activity of the hostage takers was focused on their own release to which the British government and police did not pay any attention and their attempt to negotiate with the Arab ambassadors also failed.

 

The group’s disappointment over realization of its demand resulted in exerting more pressures on the hostages to take some steps in this regard and we released three announcements, in English and Farsi, which are now available at the Scotland Yard. We mentioned a few points, such as the hostages were not spies and that were treated properly by the hostage takers, in the three announcements.

 

I had already explained to the group that there was no possibility for the surrender of the Islamic Republic government to their demands and they had realized this more or less. Up to the noon on Saturday they had allowed us to hold mass prayers but since then they prevented us from doing so.

 

Up to Saturday, the group had talked with us about their aspiration and establishment of a free Arabia (Khuzestan) and self-rule of Arab people and expressed dissatisfaction with the officials, especially former governor general and a number of religious personalities.

 

On Saturday I went to the bathroom where I noticed insulting slogans written on the wall against state officials, the clergy and the Leader of the Revolution Imam Khomeini. It strongly provoked me, as the representative of the nation in London to such an extent that I protested to three members of the group who accepted that it was not an appropriate measure and said they would inform their leader of the issue. I entered my room and told those who were present there that if we remained silent against the insult against a governor general and certain clergy now we should not remain indifferent towards insult against the revolution leader. Therefore I demanded to talk with the leader of the group. At this time, martyr Lavasani loudly condemned the measure and called them enemies of Islam which provoked them, especially the deputy leader (Feiz) who attacked the room with his machine gun but was calmed down with the mediation of a number of English speaking hostages and the Syrian (Mostafa) and once again silence prevailed everywhere.

 

At this time Feiz entered the room and wrote an insulting slogan against Imam Khomeini on the wall. Martyr Lavasani and I looked at each other and smiled and told those hostages who were present that the slogan indicated our victory and annihilation of the enemy.

 

Since this moment up to Monday there was nothing but silence and terror and the group had set a two-hour deadline and was waiting for a relief from outside (from the Foreign Office and the police for their own release). In the afternoon on Monday, and after termination of the deadline, they summoned Lavasani, downstairs. Lavasani could speak Arabic to some extent and while he was leaving the room he told us the group intended to terrorize and not kill anyone. But after a few minutes we heard three shots and all believed that they had shot into the air.

 

However, they announced if after 45 minutes their demand was not met they would kill the second hostage. They later shot at us, injuring me and killing Samadzadeh. Finally, in the embassy incident two were martyred (Lavasani and Samadzadeh) and two were injured, Ahmad Dadgar and myself. We were transferred to hospital.

 

Now it is obvious for me that the group was Baathist and masterminded the hostage taking plot with the help of the Iraqi government and cooperation of the Iraqi ambassador in London. The fact that they were Baathist was obvious from the very beginning. On the third day (Friday) one of the members of the group told me: “You are good at giving interview and speaking on television... when you said it was the hand of the US imperialism coming out of the sleeve of Saddam Hussein.” He did not answer my question as to where and when he had watched the interview. Also, while the leader of the group was criticizing the Iranian government for imprisoning and killing “innocent Kurdish and Arab people”, we asked him what the charges of 91 prisoners were, he said innocence. And in response to my question that what charges the government had leveled against them, he replied “being Baathist”. This, together with their emphasis for the presence of the Iraqi ambassador, left no doubt for us that the group was Baathist agents and US lackeys.