Politics of Muharram (I): Shah, the Yazid of the age
Sermon gatherings have been a cardinal religious institution of Iranian society for long, bearing cultural, political and social functions, as well as their inherent religious function. In Iran’s contemporary history, specifically since the mid-Qajar era, sermon gatherings [in which a cleric preaches for an audience], along with mourning congregations [where in a melancholic tone, the hardships the Shi’a Imams suffered throughout their life is related] have played a crucial role -more often than not the most crucial role- in the light of their influence among the religious strand of society.
In the mid-1950s, in the wake of the death of Ayatollah Boroujerdi, the arch-marja’ [religious leader] of the Shi’a World in his time, the last Shah of Iran, Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi, found room to materialize his ambitious plan to secularize Iranian society. He had entered a new age of his rule, characterized with political repression, strict censorship, dissociation from the clergy and a surge towards Westernization. His ostentatious 1963 White Revolution infuriated the clergy and provoked their protest, channeled through sermon congregations. As the Muharram of 1963 approached, clerics decided to utilize the potential of mourning congregations to preserve the memory of the Feizieh Seminary incident (clash between security forces and people –mostly seminary students- gathering in the Qom-based religious school which resulted in fatalities). A few weeks before the start of Muharram, hosting a group of clerics, Ayatollah Khomeini urged the preachers not to fear the Shah’s police, since they were not able to curb Shi’a mourning [rituals].” He also sent telegrams to preachers across the country, encouraging them to employ Muharram to criticize the regime’s conduct.
In response, the security apparatus issued a directive to all police stations, instructing them to secure written promises from preachers “not to mention anything but the religion and mourning-related matters and enunciating the passions [of Imam Hussein and his companions in Karbala].” SAVAK, the notorious secret police of the Shah’s regime, fired a warning shot across the preachers’ bow, summoning the senior of the ilk and warning them not to speak provocatively over the minbar. Upon discovering the plan, Ayatollah Khomeini released a statement addressing preachers, leaders of mourning ensembles and religious congregations, calling the SAVAK directive an abrogation of law, and encouraged them to turn Muharram into a platform for political protests by singing political nohehs (1).
And the 1963 Muharram turned so: the most political, revolution-laden ceremony in decades, as revolutionary preachers pilloried the regime and the cabinet. People chanted “Hussein was killed fighting for freedom”, preachers openly attacked the government and for the first time religious-political nohehs were sung for the public. The protests reached their apex on the day of Ashoura. Defying SAVAK’s threats, Ayatollah Khomeini made a historical, rabble-rousing speech in the Feizieh Seminary. After narrating the travails of Imam Hussein (AS) and his household in Karbala, the ayatollah launched his direct diatribe against the Shah (“Sir! Your Majesty!” he said, “I advise you to quit this conduct! They are abusing you! I don’t want to see the day when people thank God as you leave [power] upon the command of [your foreign] masters!”) He also compared the Shah’s security police’s brutal crackdown in the Feizieh Seminary to the conduct of the army of Yazid (second Umayyad Caliph who ordered the death of Imam Hussein). The speech, a trendsetter that ushered in analogies between the Islamic Revolution and the Ashoura incident, prompted the regime to arrest Ayatollah Khomeini at the midnight of the same day. His detention sparked off protests across the country in the following days, resulting in a confrontation between people and the military which ended in tens of casualties and gave birth to militant resistance against the regime.
On the brink of Muharram 1964, the Shah’s intelligence services kept a tight control over the mourning ceremonies, learning their lesson from the 1963 proceedings. They introduced new policies, i.e. luring the preachers, taking control of hotspot congregations and dispatching infiltrators who kept an eye on the ceremonies to report any misconduct. Nonetheless, on the back of the 1963 uprising, 1964 was no less political. Ayatollah Khomeini’s release had enlivened the revolutionary preachers. Comparing the proceedings of the age and the Karbala tragedy, and comparing the politicians to hated figures in Shi’a culture was now in vogue.
SAVAK’s vice-like grip was kept up until the end of the 1960s, with new batches of preachers added to SAVAK’s blacklist on a yearly basis. As the 1970s started, there emerged a new version of political preach which in terms of focus relied on new issues such as illuminating the history of early Islam, interpreting the Quran in a modern, revolutionary context, and political analysis of the age of Shi’a Imams. Directly or indirectly, preachers used every opportunity to propagate against the monarchy with tailor-made readings.
A revolutionary model of Islam emerged concomitant with this current, particularly promoted by two influential Islamist scholars, Ayatollah Motahhari and Ali Shariati. Motahhari’s proposed model was a comprehensive Islam which had plans for both social and individual dimensions. His Islam was not intimidated by progress and was adapted to temporal circumstances. In his framework, rather than a tragedy, Ashoura was a legend, beyond temporal and geographical constraints, which should be replicated at every age. His biggest concern was disemboweling Ashoura from its social functions and turning it into a sedative.
Ali Shariati introduced an egalitarian and political version of Islam, with new readings of basic Shi’a concepts such as justice and Ashoura, launching a vigorous campaign against traditional readings of Islam then prevalent in Iranian society. The Islam of Shariati was thoroughly ideological, replete with contrasting dualities which gained him massive popularity within the revolutionary climate of those days. His reading of Ashoura aimed to construct a historical picture of the Shi’s denomination, ideally tailored to the vision of the revolutionaries of the time and apparently influenced by the Marxist thoughts of the age. For Shariati, history was the stage of combat between two hostile forces, not the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, but between “the men of Able” and “the men of Cain”. In his way, Shariati was of course accused of reproducing Marxist doctrines through Shi’a terminology.
Ayatollah Salehi Najafabadi also criticized the common interpretations of Ashoura in his book “The Immortal Martyr”, bringing fresh insight revolving around the idea that Ashoura should be interpreted as an earthly event, free from supernatural and mythical elements. In Najafabadi’s controversial reading of Ashoura (which faced fierce criticism inside the Qom seminaries), Imam Hussein was a hero who had combined self-sacrifice with deep insight and political wisdom. His battle with Yazid was a rational, fully thought out act, aimed to topple the caliph and take power. The key objective of Najafabadi was to revive the rational, political dimension of Ashoura, at a time when determinism and sentimentalism were prevalent in the common readings of Ashoura.
The shift in content and tone brought popularity for the congregations among the younger revolutionary generation and put the Islamists in the saddle, pulling down the Marxist parties in the anti-Shah campaign. The powerful wave even impelled less political clerics to hint at social and political issues in their sermons. Thus, Ashoura was indeed the fulcrum of revolutionary discourse in the 1960s and 1970s.
(1) Noaheh is a melancholic rhythm sung in Muharram rituals, usually narrating the events of the day of Ashoura and the inner feelings of Imam Hussein and his companions.
* Mohsen Hesam-Mazaheri is a researcher specializing in Shi'a mourning rituals. He is the editor-in-chief the Habil Quarterly, which is a critical reader of the post-Revolution culture and the 8-year war with Iraq. He is also the author of The Shi’a Media, an award-winning book on the history of Muharram rituals in Iran.