The Five plus One’s Seventh Member

Mohammad Irani

The announcement of the Bushehr nuclear power plant’s integration into the national electrical grid, just one day after the IAEA published its report on Iran’s nuclear activities, and at a time when Moscow has put on the table its ‘step-by-step’ proposal, signals Iran's nuclear case’s return to the diplomatic agenda after a period of recession. This piece tries to focus on a number of key issues which may be helpful to get a clear picture of the future of Iran's nuclear program. Any likely scenario concerning this program will be affected by a combination of the following factors:

Firstly, the initiation of the Bushehr reactor’s activity and its integration into the national electrical grid will transform the international community’s view towards the nuclear program. The power plant adds a purely peaceful feature (with no dual applications) to Iran's nuclear program, and forcefully justifies development of a domestic fuel cycle inside Iran. To date, no Western sources have claimed that the Bushehr nuclear power plant is a threat in terms of nuclear proliferation. Even the UN Security Council resolutions have excluded the power plant from sanctions or suspension. In the meantime, the same reactor consumes around thirty tons of 3.5-5 percent enriched uranium per annum, which calls for inevitable massive enrichment. The accusations against Iran for its uranium enrichment are now dismissed. Even the Natanz nuclear site working at full capacity is only capable of providing one-year’s fuel consumption of the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

The argument that Russia has undertaken the responsibility of providing fuel for the nuclear power plant, thus Iran's enrichment activities becoming meaningless, is absolutely baseless. For more than a decade, Moscow held the power plant hostage and used it as the trump card in its deals with the US, while the project was scheduled to be finished in five years. There is no guarantee that Moscow would not use the nuclear fuel for the Bushehr reactor as another level to bargain with Washington in the future. The Russians have proven to be deeply interested in tradeoffs where benefits lie. They will never miss a lucrative deal with the Americans in return for cementing ties with Iran. This is the general pattern of their behavior: the Russians resist Washington’s demands only if there are no chances of trading off with the US over Iran-related issues.

In brief, the Bushehr nuclear power plant launched its activity for the following reasons: 1) the power plant’s capacity to be wielded by Moscow in its deals with Washington has been drained: “this cow gives no more milk.” 2) Security arraignments and intensive investigations have removed any possibilities for the Bushehr power plant to turn into a proliferation site. 3) The Russians have the feeling that with further procrastination in the project, Iran will achieve nuclear know-how and deprive them of cooperation in other nuclear projects. There are already serious doubts about Russia being a reliable partner for the second phase of the Bushehr nuclear project. The delay also erodes trust of Russia and undermines its status in the global nuclear market. Clearly, Moscow’s share of this market is less than the US and the EU, and a tarnished reputation equals missed opportunities. At the moment, the Indians are eyeing the fate of Bushehr’s nuclear power plant to make the final decision about signing a nuclear contract with Moscow.

The launch of the Bushehr reactor will transform the nature of Iran's nuclear program and shift it from a political-security phase into a commercial one, which encourages competition.

The second scenario for Iran's nuclear program comes from Yukia Amano’s recent report, one which is poor in new data, but hints of trends which call for Iran's vigilance. In fact, two basic trends are visible in the report: Iran's nuclear program progresses despite the pressures and sabotage, and the West has faced absolute defeat in this area. In the meantime, Iran has fully exposed its nuclear program to the IAEA and none of its nuclear facilities face legal complications. This is a point confessed by IAEA in the report.

The second trend is more subtle and complex. Since a few months ago, a conspicuous determination in IAEA reports attempts to exclude Iran's nuclear program from possible military dimensions (PMD). This determination is becoming stronger, with Amano trying to downplay all other aspects of Iran's nuclear program vis-à-vis this issue. The question is this: does the West really think Iran is building nuclear weapons? The answer is: ‘definitely not’. Then what is the cause of the IAEA’s focus on and aggrandizement of the likely military aspects of Iran's nuclear program?

Elaborating on this question calls for a lengthy discussion within the conceptual framework of the ‘security attitude towards Iran's nuclear program.’ All the complaints and doomsday scenarios promoted by the West intend not to stop Iran from making a nuclear weapon, but to integrate it into certain political projects, like the one recently proposed by Russia. In that case, the IAEA can be confidently called the seventh member of Five plus One.