Leadership of Rebellions was not in Tahrir Square

IRD: Usually, the phenomenon of social movements is interpreted based on the four elements of widespread dissatisfaction, leadership, organization and ideology. In addition to widespread discontent, do we have the other three components in the protest movements in the Arab world?

AA: The social movements can be discussed in detail, but here, if by social movement you mean the important and stable aspects of social life, leadership is not needed for social movements, like the tendency to democracy as an aspect of modern social life. In this sense, social movements are a public process that exist within the community in various detailed formats. But when a certain circumstance in the process turns to a determined project or plan, at this stage, gradually organization and leadership of the slogans and demands should comparatively be formed.

But it should not be forgotten that this transition process to project does not occur immediately, but in terms of social circumstances, takes time. By this preliminary explanation, we can claim that the movement with the first meaning and the process of seeking democracy in all countries of the region experienced intensity in some cases and weakness in others. But the conversion of the simple process to a comprehensive one, including democracy, has not been witnessed in the Arab region so far.

Of course, in the past, one of the main slogans of the movements of the Arab community was freedom and democracy. From Abdel Nasser in Egypt to the Ba’ath parties in Iraq and Syria, the government of Southern Yemen and then Gaddafi and the like, they had the slogan of democracy, the rule of people over people, and freedom, but the slogans were empty of any objective, or at best and in the form of the interpretations of the 50’s and 60’s, could be interpreted against itself. Naming the squares “Tahrir” in most of the Arab countries is the result of the era and its slogans.

But in the past decade, a significant change has occurred in the entire world which includes the Arab world. The most important feature is the internet and satellite communication. Especially in the Arab world, due to a common language but with the wide variety of governments and their extensive contact with the international community (in comparison with Iran) in which many Arabs are active, the changes were deeper.

With countries like Iran, having its unique language, i.e. Persian (except Afghanistan and Tajikistan that speak Persian dialects and are not that influential), the influences of satellite communications and the Internet have been less than in Arab countries. The development is the foundation for forming network organization and mutual understanding and values; but because of the closed circle of the Arab countries, they could not create a leadership mechanism; even no evidence of such a leadership can be witnessed.

I think that the incidence of events in Tunisia and Egypt, but not Libya, initially was caused by the dissatisfactory economic situation, not lack of democracy. Since the movement seeking democracy, I mean the first meaning, that formed within the community and gradually found its appropriate mechanisms for the transition from process to project, began during the crisis—although it naturally lacked the experience and mechanism of leadership in the transition-to-project stage and could not compensate in a short period of less than one month—becoming a democracy movement, I mean in the second meaning. If this path could be longer, the movement would have succeeded in having leadership for its democracy in the existing social structures, or the government would have suppressed it. But the path did not become longer, and the main reason was the locomotive added out to the train.

The train was moving in the first two weeks by relying on the initial inertia and then continued by relying on the locomotive of the United States. Therefore, it can be claimed that in the final stage of the social movement in Egypt, with the addition of new leadership, all three components of widespread discontent, network organization and demands were directed anew.

IRD: What is your analysis and evaluation of the element of leadership in the revolutionary movement of the people of Egypt and Tunisia?

I think that since last year and in his visit to Egypt, Obama’s policy regarding the Middle East was somewhat predictable. The U.S. government realized that without democratic changes, regional governments face instability and sooner or later, cause a crisis in relations between Israel and Arab countries; therefore, the US supported a controlled transformation in the Arab countries. But the problem was the unavailability of the implementation of the idea, and they did not want to put pressure on their non-democratic allies.

But incidents in Egypt and then Tunisia prepared them to practically control the flow by supporting these events, to keep the totality of the structure by the removal of Bin-Ali and especially Mubarak, to maintain its prestige among Arabs, and to follow minor reforms.

I think in Egypt, ElBaradei fulfilled the task semi-officially and by requesting that the Egyptian Army take appropriate action, promoted the Army’s role in public opinion. Ultimately the Egyptian army dismissed Mubarak and the matter was dealt with in the least radical and critical manner.

Therefore, it can be claimed that the above-mentioned movement, since entering the process, lacked leadership, but the United States could fill this gap in practice with ease and tact. Let’s not forget that the first foreign official who visited Egypt since the fall of the Mubarak was David Cameron, the British Prime Minister and the visit is fully meaningful.

IRD: Do these movements have a principled and effective organization?

AA: As I said, the organization was based on the conditions of the process and also the democracy movement, insufficient for the transition process; that is why that after the resignation of Hosni Mubarak, the crisis almost ended and there is little chance that the crisis will return again.

IRD: These movements seem to gain achievements with no certain leadership. How is it possible?

AA: Considering what was mentioned, I do not think that this movement had no real leadership. Although technically no one led it, leadership can be seen practically.

It seems that the significant increase in Egyptian demonstrators in the final days of the event, where the modern and urban classes joined in, was completely planned; they were among the revolutionaries who came to the Tahrir Square immediately after the fall of Mubarak and demanded that the first demonstrators leave the square.

It is interesting that Mubarak’s police, hated before his fall, immediately joined the revolution and along with the army and in the first step, made people leave Tahrir Square. Therefore, it can be claimed that not only the movement enjoyed leadership, but also had a very coherent and planned leadership. However, the leadership was not in the square, but some other place, i.e. in Washington and in the offices of Egyptian military commanders.

Mubarak’s reliance on Washington provided the opportunity for the US to play the role of the leader; if Egypt had no direct reliance on the US like Libya, the situation would probably have gotten more critical. The other point to bear in mind is that the leadership and people’s demands in the Egyptian movement were not extended. Although this is not a drawback, it still cannot be called a revolution, because if it was a revolution, the Egyptians would not remain silent in the face of the crimes of Gaddafi and at least Arab and Egyptian volunteers would depart to defend the Libyan people.

IRD: Is there any "diverse leadership" in the new democratic movements and primarily in some of the political and social movements? What does the diverse leadership mean?

AA: Word play does not solve the problem: leadership is a functional concept. In the process stage, any movement enjoys diverse leaderships, each of which is accompanied by its followers taking the path determined by the social necessities, but in the project stage, there is no diverse leadership and all the leaders must ultimately take the same path.

IRD: in your opinion, if there were no US support for the people of Egypt and Tunisia, would Ben Ali and Mubarak be overthrown?

AA: It was a possibility, but in this case, the result was closer to the Libyan situation than that to current Egypt. Furthermore, a US possible defense of Bin Ali and Egypt would make the regional situation worse due to the anti-American atmosphere.

Of course, there was the possibility that this regime could suppress people in the short term and more talks would be useless and just a mind exercise, because according to its strategies in Iraq, the United States, even in the time of the Bush presidency, did not resist the social movements against Bin Ali and Mubarak and was even supposed to take a neutral position. When we claim the world has changed, an important aspect of this change is US behavior. When the Americans do not defend the crackdown in Bahrain, what can be expected for Egypt and Tunisia?

IRD: Is the US support for the people’s revolution related to the nature of Tunisians and Egyptians protesting political leaders in these two countries?

AA: Not that much; it was not a decisive factor. Furthermore, according to what I said, the protesters, in terms of having a leadership, felt the gap and the nature of the leadership could not certainly be guessed.

IRD: To what extent are the political futures of Egypt and Tunisia dependent on the performance of the current leaders of the two countries?

AA: As mentioned, the existing leaders of both parties and the youth in Tahrir Square were not that able to lead the movement entirely to achieve the favorable point result; therefore, the term of leadership cannot be applicable here. The future of Egyptian society depends on not only the various party leaders, but also economic issues and other developments in the Arab community and the world. As I do not have an accurate and complete familiarity with the domestic issues, I cannot express the importance, priority and effectiveness of these factors.