Egypt’s Developments and Regional Affairs

Notwithstanding the interim rule of the military council, the general orientation of Egypt’s developments is toward democratization, a process that will ultimately give weight to its citizens and political parties. Given the current circumstances—where post-Mubarak political arrangements have not been established—hazarding bold guesses about Egypt’s future would not be a wise move. The most critical question of the moment may be: will the next establishment remain committed to the Camp David Accords (signed by Anwar Sadat and strictly adhered to by Mubarak’s regime in the last thirty years)? The answer is most likely yes. Changes in Egypt are more of a reform (however deep) than a revolution.

It seems that the initial impact of Egypt’s political transformation will be on the form of governance in other Arab states, be they military regimes, monarchies, republics or a combination of these forms (e.g. republics where the presidency has become hereditary). Palestinian affairs will, however, be the case which undergoes tangential changes as a consequence of the changes in Cairo. At present, the most serious problem in Palestine is the unfortunate Hamas-Fatah split. If reform-oriented, the next Egyptian government will try to re-forge unity between the Palestinian groups; otherwise the entire spectrum of efforts to further the Palestinian cause is doomed to fail.

However, it would be premature to predict the overall attitude of Egyptian citizens toward Arab affairs. Inside Iran, cultural and media circles lack a clear understanding of the nature of developments in Egypt. The cause of this unfamiliarity is of course clear: since the 1979 Islamic Republic, our interactions with Egypt have been fairly limited and we have lost touch with Egypt’s social developments. Among Iranians, there is an erroneous perception that Egyptian citizens are poised to attack Israel. What they fail to notice is that Egypt is a diverse society with different attitudes and the citizens prioritize domestic problems, such as economy, over regional affairs, including the Arab-Israeli conflict. Although with an acceptable degree of certainty one can claim that Mubarak’s regional attitudes and the Camp David Accord are not fully approved by ordinary Egyptian citizens, we can assign weight to each political current only after free elections are held. It is predictable, nonetheless, that the next Egyptian establishment will not adopt a rejectionist attitude toward the accord.

Lebanon, another Arab hot spot, will most likely remain largely unaffected by the developments in Egypt. Lebanon already enjoys what the Egyptians have been calling for, that is political freedom, media freedom, freedom of speech or in one word: democracy (though in a unique form.) The main impact of Egypt’s political transformation on Lebanon may be Israel’s scaled-down intervention in Beirut’s political affairs, as it becomes occupied with the actions of a less friendly state on its southern borders.