Learning from Egypt

13 February 2011 | 00:48 Code : 10311 Middle East.
By Ahmad Naqibzadeh.
Learning from Egypt
Revolutions can be analogous to an earthquake. Just as through the study of fault lines seismologists identify earthquake-prone locations (though they are unable to predict the time and magnitude), sociologists can detect revolution-prone countries through a survey of the existing social fault lines -though here again, the exact time and dynamics of the revolution remain questionable. There was much prima facie evidence to prove the existence of such fault lines in Egypt and Tunisia. If the fact that nearly half a million people live in Cairo’s necropolis is not powerful enough evidence, the immolation of the young Tunisian Mohamed Bouazizi over a bitter row with a policewoman should have convinced skeptics of a grave situation.

The uprisings of North Africa are neither similar to the 1979 Islamic Revolution of Iran -as the IRI loyalist media strained every nerve to prove- nor to the Green Movement; though they may have taken lessons from these two developments. Interestingly, it seems that compared to societies, the states are more eager to imitate each other. Hosni Mubarak’s mimicry of the Iranian government -resisting popular demands to tackle the problem in the long run- proved futile nonetheless since –apart from the significant differences between the Egyptians’ protests and the Iranian Green Movement- he and his coterie neither enjoyed the Islamic Republic’s social base and independence nor had supporters as faithful and belligerent.

The ebb and flow of developments in Egypt also proved how regimes backed by foreign powers will lose much of their mettle when the prop is taken away. Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the last Shah of Iran, listened more to the words of the British and American ambassadors than his own people and it was the ambassadors’ governments that determined his fate. Western countries wavered between supporting Mubarak and the Egyptian nation, from support for the democratic demands of al-Tahrir Square dwellers to speaking of reconciliation (when demonstrations appeared to have lost their impetus), to warning of Islamophobia as soon as the Muslim Brotherhood held public prayers on the streets.

Mubarak is, of course, not the first one in the list of despots betrayed by Western countries. In one fleeting glimpse, these hapless autocrats can be betrayed by Western countries (which, by the way, have accumulated at least half of their wealth and power through five hundred years of exploitation of weaker countries). Though they may be more than embarrassed to remember, Western countries, first in line the US, were the ones who brought Manuel Noriega, Augusto Pinochet and Saddam Hussein to power. Michele Alliot-Marie, the French foreign minister, was vacationing in Tunisia when unrest broke out, and had enjoyed the use of the private jet of a businessman linked with the Ben Ali family. Western countries back their iron-fisted Third World friends as long as possible and play down popular protests, just to morph into pro-democracy champions as soon as they find out there is no chance to keep their old friends in power.

Egypt’s upheaval will leave a deep impression on Arab World affairs (it is common knowledge that despite the downward trends of Mubarak’s era, Egypt is still one of, if not the, most influential Arab country). If the course of development shifts to a different track and the Muslim Brotherhood –which have tried to keep a low profile during the demonstrations- jump in the saddle, they will try to push Egypt toward a more Islamic state and sever ties with Israel. The latter possibility may plunge the country into another war with Israel after 40 years. The MB can meanwhile turn into a serious rival of the Islamic Republic –and its brand of revolutionary Islam- and may launch an anti-Shi’a campaign in its sphere of influence. They will stay close to Iran, however, if they do not hold a share of the power cake and are marginalized in the Egyptian politics. If another secular regime comes to power, the most likely scenario will be its failure to overcome the deep-seated problems of Egyptian society, the country’s plunging again into chaos and the emergence of another dictator, be it a rightist, leftist or Islamist one.

At any event, difficult years await Egypt, unless the country receives the support of the international community and conservative regional powers (such as the Saudis). Dictators who repress crises instead of resolving them hurt both themselves and their nation. There are indeed lessons to learn from Egypt.

Ahmad Naqibzadeh is professor of political sciences in the University of Tehran.