Democracy and Egypt’s Political Future
Egypt will follow neither an Iranian nor Turkish model of governance. Rahman Qahremanpour.
Two weeks have passed since the Day or Rage in Egypt ushered in a wave of unrest in this ancient country. As usual, political commentators have been quick on the trigger to impute their preferred quality to the Egyptians’ uprising. The basic question is whether the country will be ruled by (moderate) Islamists or will it retain its secular mode of governance.
Egypt is a society with unique problems. Compared to Tunisia, the state is significantly stronger in Egypt. That unlike his Tunisian counterpart Ben Ali, Husni Mubarak (and his security and business coterie -the main beneficiaries of his liberal economic policies) is still in control of the situation bears testimony to this claim. In the event of resignation -suggested by Washington and some other Western countries as a quick fix to the chaos in his country- Mubarak will strive to insure this powerful bloc against marginalization in power, most likely through Gen. Omar Soleiman, his intelligence strongman, who, compared to Mubarak’s son and heir apparent Gamal, is a more tolerable figure for the West. To reverse this scenario, however, Husni Mubarak and his team have embarked on a set of cosmetic reforms to prevent Egypt from changing hands. For now, Mubarak’s safety net, Omar Soleiman -head of the country’s intelligence services and a man with a military background- is holding conciliatory dialogue with opposition groups -including the Muslim Brotherhood. As Egypt’s largest sociopolitical upheaval in decades is taking place, we have to wait and see if reconciliation is approved by the grassroots or whether they will press for radical transformation of the regime.
The unfolding situation in Egypt -and the Middle East in general- can be partially framed as dismissal of the residues of the Cold War era. Turkey, which ruled Egypt during the age of the Ottoman Empire, is undergoing the same process -out of phase. Dispensing with the old mindset, Turkish society is purging the Cold War-era elite (which had a knack for reducing every challenge to economic factors and -in case of failure- view it through a security prism) from power.
In the eyes of the majority of political observers, Egypt is moving on the same path as Turkey, i.e. one which will lead to the ascent of moderate Islamists to power. Shades of autocracy in both countries, however, should not mislead us into forgetting the less visible, yet deeply influential, differences.
In Egypt, power is concentrated in the hands of one person. Husni Mubarak, Anwar Sadat and Gamal Abdel Nasser all ruled as omnipotent presidents of the country. In contrast, the Kemalists of Turkey channeled their efforts into establishing institutions that perpetuated their grip on power and impeded democratic movements. Since its rise to power, the AK Party of Turkey has pursued a low-key battle against these deep-seated institutions which were the real power-holders in the country.
Moreover, in Egypt institution-building has been quite frail a process. For instance, in Turkey, where the road to democracy is yet to be trodden and the Kemalist institutions are still resisting the citizens’ democratic calls, the judiciary is significantly more independent than its Egyptian counterpart (which like most other institutions is subject to Mubarak’s whim.) Even the army, which proclaims to be the legitimate heir to Gamal Abdel Nasser’s legacy and boasts a pan-Arab sentiment, has not fully dissociated itself from Mubarak in the recent developments, but has rather served as a mediator between the president and the people.
The political dynamic of Turkey is an inter-elite struggle carried out between pro-democracy forces and the staunchly secular military. In Egypt it is one between the ruling elite and the people. The AK Party is trying to clip -but not to cut- the wings of the Kemalist institutions. In Egypt, the protestors’ basic demand is the ouster of Mubarak and limiting the authority of the presidential position.
Egypt will not follow a Turkish model of statecraft -or an Iranian one, as some in the Western media are trying to sell to their politicians. Throughout decades, Egypt has been the most respected Arab country with a distinct identity. Cairo has been the third vertex, besides Tehran and Ankara, which influences regional affairs. Throughout his three-decade rule, Mubarak has implemented a failed policy, a supposedly middle path between the diplomatic approaches of Anwar Sadat and Gamal Abdel Nasser, which actually diminished Egypt’s once overwhelming regional influence. This has indeed been a major source of discontent among the Egyptians. Nasserists aspire to an Egypt that will pattern itself on the glorious decades of the 1950s and 1960s; the Muslim Brotherhood follows its own specific model which is imbued with Islamic doctrines, and the April 6 Youth Movement strives for a ‘local’ democratic pattern.
Nevertheless, there are doubts about democracy being the final product of the massive protests in Egypt. Democracy is not a power reshuffle or the change of an unpopular figurehead with a loved one. Democracy entails the existence of a political culture which is, among many other prerequisites, pro-negotiation. Egypt -or any other Arab country in the region- is void of this culture.
Rahman Qahremanpour is a fellow researcher on disarmament in the Center for Strategic Research.
Egypt is a society with unique problems. Compared to Tunisia, the state is significantly stronger in Egypt. That unlike his Tunisian counterpart Ben Ali, Husni Mubarak (and his security and business coterie -the main beneficiaries of his liberal economic policies) is still in control of the situation bears testimony to this claim. In the event of resignation -suggested by Washington and some other Western countries as a quick fix to the chaos in his country- Mubarak will strive to insure this powerful bloc against marginalization in power, most likely through Gen. Omar Soleiman, his intelligence strongman, who, compared to Mubarak’s son and heir apparent Gamal, is a more tolerable figure for the West. To reverse this scenario, however, Husni Mubarak and his team have embarked on a set of cosmetic reforms to prevent Egypt from changing hands. For now, Mubarak’s safety net, Omar Soleiman -head of the country’s intelligence services and a man with a military background- is holding conciliatory dialogue with opposition groups -including the Muslim Brotherhood. As Egypt’s largest sociopolitical upheaval in decades is taking place, we have to wait and see if reconciliation is approved by the grassroots or whether they will press for radical transformation of the regime.
The unfolding situation in Egypt -and the Middle East in general- can be partially framed as dismissal of the residues of the Cold War era. Turkey, which ruled Egypt during the age of the Ottoman Empire, is undergoing the same process -out of phase. Dispensing with the old mindset, Turkish society is purging the Cold War-era elite (which had a knack for reducing every challenge to economic factors and -in case of failure- view it through a security prism) from power.
In the eyes of the majority of political observers, Egypt is moving on the same path as Turkey, i.e. one which will lead to the ascent of moderate Islamists to power. Shades of autocracy in both countries, however, should not mislead us into forgetting the less visible, yet deeply influential, differences.
In Egypt, power is concentrated in the hands of one person. Husni Mubarak, Anwar Sadat and Gamal Abdel Nasser all ruled as omnipotent presidents of the country. In contrast, the Kemalists of Turkey channeled their efforts into establishing institutions that perpetuated their grip on power and impeded democratic movements. Since its rise to power, the AK Party of Turkey has pursued a low-key battle against these deep-seated institutions which were the real power-holders in the country.
Moreover, in Egypt institution-building has been quite frail a process. For instance, in Turkey, where the road to democracy is yet to be trodden and the Kemalist institutions are still resisting the citizens’ democratic calls, the judiciary is significantly more independent than its Egyptian counterpart (which like most other institutions is subject to Mubarak’s whim.) Even the army, which proclaims to be the legitimate heir to Gamal Abdel Nasser’s legacy and boasts a pan-Arab sentiment, has not fully dissociated itself from Mubarak in the recent developments, but has rather served as a mediator between the president and the people.
The political dynamic of Turkey is an inter-elite struggle carried out between pro-democracy forces and the staunchly secular military. In Egypt it is one between the ruling elite and the people. The AK Party is trying to clip -but not to cut- the wings of the Kemalist institutions. In Egypt, the protestors’ basic demand is the ouster of Mubarak and limiting the authority of the presidential position.
Egypt will not follow a Turkish model of statecraft -or an Iranian one, as some in the Western media are trying to sell to their politicians. Throughout decades, Egypt has been the most respected Arab country with a distinct identity. Cairo has been the third vertex, besides Tehran and Ankara, which influences regional affairs. Throughout his three-decade rule, Mubarak has implemented a failed policy, a supposedly middle path between the diplomatic approaches of Anwar Sadat and Gamal Abdel Nasser, which actually diminished Egypt’s once overwhelming regional influence. This has indeed been a major source of discontent among the Egyptians. Nasserists aspire to an Egypt that will pattern itself on the glorious decades of the 1950s and 1960s; the Muslim Brotherhood follows its own specific model which is imbued with Islamic doctrines, and the April 6 Youth Movement strives for a ‘local’ democratic pattern.
Nevertheless, there are doubts about democracy being the final product of the massive protests in Egypt. Democracy is not a power reshuffle or the change of an unpopular figurehead with a loved one. Democracy entails the existence of a political culture which is, among many other prerequisites, pro-negotiation. Egypt -or any other Arab country in the region- is void of this culture.
Rahman Qahremanpour is a fellow researcher on disarmament in the Center for Strategic Research.