Regime stability of Arab States and Iran
In the meantime, the revolts that started in Tunisia have spread to several Arab countries, and have now reached Egypt. It is evident why the riots have captured Egypt most intensely. The regime of President Hosni Mubarak was akin to the Tunisian regime in many ways, despite the fact that the Egyptian system will prove to be more stable and more resistant, particularly as it profits from the experience of the Tunisian revolution and the awkward TV appearances of President Zeynel Abidin Ben Ali.
The current unrest in the streets of the Arab countries have thus far not spread to Iran, in spite of the strong reductions of subsidies that began one month ago, which pose the greatest structural economic reform in recent Iranian history. Some Western commentators regarded the reductions of subsidies as a success of the latest sanctions, even though the IMF has been recommending Iran for many years to cut its gigantic subsidies. As a matter of fact, the reductions, which have occurred, are a sign of the political stability and economic prosperity of Iran. No government prior to Ahmadinejad was able to tackle the long overdue reform, although the debate in Iran had been going on for more than a decade. It is all the more bizarre that even some newspapers with laissez-faire policies in the U.S. and Europe played down and did not welcome these bold measures. Ultimately, there were no protests whatsoever after these severe reductions.
At the moment, the situation is very different in the Arab world, where Arab regimes try to prevent protests and bring them under control respectively by expanding and increasing the subsidies. Nevertheless, the Arab demonstrations are often associated with the riots that took place in Iran two years ago. However, on closer examination the difference between the two events is significant.
For instance, in Tunisia the riots emanated from the lower class of society and then slowly spread to the big cities up to the middle class. In Iran, however, the demonstrations were primarily carried by the upper and middle classes of the capital city Tehran. Moreover, in the case of Iran there was a polarised atmosphere amongst the political elite and the voting public, caused by the first-time broadcasted debates on TV. On the other hand, there have never been any genuine elections in the Arab countries in question, let alone public television debates between the presidential candidates. In comparison to many Islamic countries around the world there are far more presidential candidates to choose from in the political system of Iran. In the year 2009 four approved candidates were admitted, in 2005 eight candidates were admitted and in 2001 there were ten candidates. Only twice in the 32-year history of the Islamic regime there were less than four candidates (1985 and 1989). More about this issue here.
In Tunisia, Algeria, Yemen and Egypt, the riots were considered as domestic, Arab and "pure", remote from immediate Western intervention. In Iran, however, it was believed that the "Green Movement" was being abused for foreign interests. "Radio Israel," "Voice of America and “BBC Farsi" belong to the major media that "helped” the protests and the demonstrators with instructed slogans* and proposed strategies for the demonstrations. Beside these mainstream media, there are a number of other television and radio stations (some are professional, others range from amateur to absurd), that spread their calls for the overthrow of the regime and their corresponding political input. Of course, the U.S. government is spending millions of dollars for the support of dissident media. Possibly no country has had to cope with so many opposition media via satellite, radio and the internet from foreign countries as Iran. The revolution in Tunisia, however, remained faithful to its "national and domestic root" and thus Ben Ali’s regime could never seriously follow the argument of a foreign conspiracy against the revolution.
The Iranian regime is stabilised not only by the factor "external threat", thereby being able to rally the people around it, but most notably due to its systemic nature and ideological superstructure.
The greatest regulatory factor of stability in the Islamic Republic of Iran is the constitution itself. Iran is not monolithic, meaning that there are actually several mutually competing centres of power, including the executive, legislative and judicial branches, which are institutionally independent from each other. In addition, there is the “non-party” office of the religious head of state (Wilayat al-Faqih) and some other centres of power, including those of the Expediency Council. That what in the Western reception is dubbed as a "system error", "power struggle" and "cracks in the regime," is literally one of the pillars of Iran’s stability.
For comparison: In Tunisia there was only one centre of power, namely that of the president. Everything was tailored to a person who had been ruling for more than 20 years. His fall was therefore tantamount to the fall of the regime, while in Iran it is only a question of personnel decision. This means that, in case of riots and national uprisings, the Islamic Republic is able to delegate the fault for plights and crises to one single person and a political branch respectively by replacing one or more leaders or a party, allowing new credible promises to be made, new hopes to be spread and the people’s anger to be curbed to the greatest possible extent.
In the relatively absolutistic ruled Tunisia (and now in Egypt), however, after more than twenty years it is difficult to shift the responsibility on individuals and make new promises. Ultimately, Ben Ali’s (who was neither a clever tactician, nor a true politician, and whose background is the secret service) first public reaction to the unrest to create 300,000 new jobs next year was at the same time his death blow. On the one hand, he thereby exposed a certain weakness and despair, thus encouraging other social groups to co-participate in the demonstrations, and on the other hand, he undermined his own credibility and 20-year-old propaganda about his competence. In fact, it was this televised appearance which made the revolt to a revolution, prior to that he himself was never the target of protests and slogans.
In addition, Ben Ali never stood for any concept of state or ideology - neither for a charismatic monarchy as in Jordan or Morocco, nor for a "spiritual value" as in the Islamic Republic of Iran – he only cared for himself. Insofar, the demoralisation of the Tunisian army and its refusal to fire at the demonstrators were feasible. This in turn reveals the aspect that Mubarak’s regime of all Arabic-Islamic states remains the most unstable, since it is the most similar to the Tunisian structure of domination.
Another stabilising aspect in the Islamic Republic is the political pluralism guaranteed within the Iranian constitution. Even though the socio-political climate narrowed since the riots the year before last, it is nevertheless still possible to criticise or even ridicule the government, individual ministers and persons in charge. The elections held almost every two years provide ample scope to function as a sufficient outlet for political and economic frustration. Indeed, one could describe the regime in Tehran as the most stable in the Islamic world. In no other country you will probably find so many citizens who would voluntarily sacrifice their lives just for the protection of their system of government as in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The opposition to the regime, however, is usually founded on worldly aspects, and you do not give your life for the material world. You live for it while you die for transcendent ideals: keyword Islamic cult of martyrdom. This is something that Tunisia’s Ben Ali could only dream of and Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak today probably is longing for on a daily basis (moreover, it should be noted that almost no other head of state in the Islamic world can mingle with the crowd as unhidden as Ahmadinejad). Furthermore, Iran has two equal armies under the control of the religious head of state (and not the president) that keep each other in check, thus rendering a military coup and military dictatorship impossible. In addition, there is the numerical potent National Guard (Basij), which is deployable both in militarily (as in the war against Iraq) as well as in home affairs (as it was the case of the student protests in Tehran in 1999). (During the Tehran riots of 2009, the Basij was deployed only at the beginning, and neither the army nor the Pasdaran had to be called up to stifle the unrest).
Not least because of the poor analysis and the misconceptions about the area, the Western policy in the Near and Middle East is facing a pile of shards. The highly acclaimed "island of stability" Tunisia was swept away within a few weeks, and the Islamic Republic of Iran, since the Islamic Revolution repeatedly declared dead by the West, has in spite of that become more influential than ever before. In the region, the perception is spreading that the U.S. - due to their power corrosion - sooner or later will take their leave from the Near and Middle East - Persia, however, stays. With great attention the Orient has therefore noted France’s handling of its former ally Ben Ali. He received no assistance in his most difficult hours, was not granted asylum, and on top of that all his and his relatives’ accounts were blocked. Conclusively, more and more political actors look for alternative partners. The U.S. torpedoing the Saudi-Syrian negotiations for settling the dispute over the Hariri tribunal brought about not the expected exclusion of Hezbollah from the government, but - thanks to former allies of the West - a Hezbollah-near government. And the Iranian diplomats asked, filled with self-confidence, for the first time - unperturbed of the new sanctions and all threats - of the G5+1 in Istanbul for the full and unconditional acceptance of Iran’s uranium enrichment and the end of the sanctions before any further nuclear talks.
It is about time that the West acknowledges the realities in the Middle East and applies a policy of reconciliation of interest as a mediator and honest arbiter - in their vested interest.
* "Obama, Obama, ya ba ma ya ba anha”, in English: "Obama, Obama, either with us or with them". This was one of many slogans that were recommended successfully in the Persian-speaking foreign media. The aim of this particular slogan was obviously to torpedo the then advances of Barack Obama to Tehran. Today, many Iranian commentators – across many parties - assume that the "Green Movement" has been a major cause for the latest sanctions.AnhöreUmschriftWörterbuch - Detaillierten Wörterbucheintrag anzeigenAnhörenUmschrift
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